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GENETIC SCREENING OF CHILDREN:
THE U.K. POSITION
Sheila A.M. McLean*

The questions raised by genetic diagnosis and screening of children
highlight some of the protectionism, contradictions, and tensions that
often characterize our attitudes toward children. Virtually every society
offers special protections to children. The status of childhood, with all of
its assumed or real vulnerability, is offered respect. Children are seen as
lacking autonomy, and therefore, incapable of reaching their own decisions. This view has led to the principle that children are to be protected
from the consequences of their behavior by laws that, for example, preclude them from entering into legally binding contracts or from being
held criminally responsible for their actions.
On the other hand, society also seeks to offer children the widest possible range of rights and the maximum protection of their interests, by giving them powers whenever possible. As a corollary, children must also
have the right to be protected from the inappropriate or invasive decisions of others. Although these dual goals of protection and empowerment may seem entirely complementary, there is no doubt that they may
sometimes come into conflict. Therefore, a balance is required. Striking
such a balance, however, is not always easy, especially when it is impossible to make simplistic assumptions about what really is in the best interest of the child.
Of particular interest, is the question of a child's health. Society seeks
to maximize the provision of health and health care services to children
consistent with both traditional and more modem pronouncements, such
as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.' While this
may seem like a straightforward translation into reality of the protectionist approach outlined above, there is the potential for conflict between
* International Bar Association Professor, Institute of Law and Ethics in Medicine,
University of Glasgow.
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda
Item 108, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (1989); see also CNrLDREN, RGrrs AND THE LAW (Philip
Alston et al. eds., 1992) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the U.N. Convention on
the Rights of the Child).
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the protectionist and empowerment approaches. In order to safeguard
children's health, it is necessary to act both preventively and therapeutically. It is essential for both prevention and therapy to obtain knowledge
about conditions that either are specific to children, or are best able to be
cured if caught early. However, acquiring the requisite knowledge for
successful prevention and therapy is not without its costs. Acquisition of
that knowledge may require the use of children in both therapeutic and
controversial nontherapeutic research. The paradox then may be that in
order to protect some children, we need to use other children as subjects
of research to gain the knowledge necessary for prevention and therapy.
Like adults, children are subject to disorders that are solely or substantially caused by genetic factors. In 1985, Daniel Kevles estimated,
"[g]enetic and chromosomal illnesses or malformations are reported to
account for between twenty and thirty percent of all pediatric hospital
admissions. "2 More recently, in 1992, J.K. Mason and R.A. McCall Smith
suggested that, "the proportion of childhood deaths attributable wholly
or partly to genetic factors runs at about 50%."1a According to the British
Medical Association, "[g]enetic and part-genetic diseases affect one in
every twenty people by the age of 25 and perhaps as many as two in three
people during their lifetime."4 In light of this evidence, it cannot be disputed that genetic disorders exact a cost on individuals and society as a
whole. Following the negative uses of genetics research in countries as
disparate with respect to treatment of human rights as the United States
and Nazi Germany, 5 the science of genetics had for some time been
viewed with considerable ambivalence if not outright hostility. Over the
years, however, advanced understanding about the role of genes has rehabilitated the science of genetics.
The resurgence of genetics is exemplified most sharply by the interest
generated by the Human Genome Project, on whose back much of the
"new" genetics rests.6 This global attempt to identify the blueprint of
2.

DANIEL

J.

HUMAN HEREDITY
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KEVLE , IN Tm NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF

291 (1985).

3. J.K. MASON & McCALL SMrrH, LAW AND MEDICAL ETMICS 123 (4th ed. 1994).
4. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, OUR GENETIC FUTURE: THE SCIENCE AND ETHOF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 1 (1992).

5. See Sheila McLean, The Right to Reproduce, in HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM RHETORIC
TO REALrrY 99, 111 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 1986); see also Sheila A.M. McLean &

Dieter Giesen, Legal and Ethical Considerationsof the Human Genome Project, 1 MEDICAL L. INT'L 159 (1994) (highlighting important legal and ethical issues raised by the
Human Genome Project).
6. See OFFICE OF ENERGY RESEARCH & OFFICE OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL
RESEARCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, HUMAN GENOME 1991-92 PROGRAM REPORT
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every individual's genetic makeup has captured public attention in a way
that is unusual for a scientific venture. Although people outside the scientific world, and many within it, fail to understand the sophisticated science of genetics, a plethora of writing addressing its legal, ethical, and
7
social implications has grown.
Although the "new" genetics has a more respectable face than might
have been predicted given its recent history, this is not to say that it is
regarded as a universal good. As Thomas Murray points out, "[s]cientific
research into human genetics has been a continuing source of intriguing,
and at times formidable, ethical issues.",8 Moreover, despite the pleas of
some commentators that "the widespread fear of genetics cannot be justified" and that "the research community should speak out strongly to defend the good sense of what it is about," many people are as afraid of the
implications of genetic information as they are astonished at its capacity,
and hopeful about the good it may ultimately offer. 9
One concern is the potential for discrimination based on genetic information, particularly if the information is inadequately protected. As the
Danish Council of Ethics has said:
Just as persons found through screening to have a particular
gene or chromosome composition may happen to feel abnormal
or outright ill[,]... so may others react to the persons involved
by giving them a wide berth. The detection of certain genetic
traits can thus form the basis for branding certain persons and
groups among the population, with the possibility of discrimination proper as a result.10
This discrimination may take place in education, health care provision,
insurance, employment, and a host of other areas of life.
iii (1992) (stating that the purpose of the Human Genome Project is to gain "complete
knowledge of the organization, structure, and function of the human genome-the master
blueprint of each of us").
7. See, e.g., WALTER BODMER & ROBIN McKm, THE BOOK OF MAN: THE HUMAN
GENOME PRoJEct AND THE QUEST TO DISCOVER OUR GENETIC HERrrAGE (1994); 1 SciENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITrEE, HOUSE OF COMMONS, HUMAN GENETICS: THE Sci-

ENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1995) [hereinafter COMMrrEE REPORT]; TOM WILKIE,
PERILouS KNOWLEDGE: THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (1993);
Sheila A.M. McLean, Mapping the Human Genome-Friendor Foe? 39 Soc. Sci. & MED.
1221, 1221-27 (1994); McLean & Giesen, supra note 5, at 159-75.
8. Thomas H. Murray, EthicalIssues in Human Genome Research, 5 FASEB J.55,55
(1991).

9. John Maddox, New Genetics Means No New Ethics, 364 NATURE 97, 97 (1993).
10. THE DANISH COUNCIL OF ETHICS, ETHICS AND MAPPING OF THE HUMAN GENorME 60 (1993) [hereinafter DANISH COUNCIL OF ETHICS].
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Of course, genetic information is not unique in this respect. The most
obvious parallel comes from those who are thought to be, or actually are,
HIV-positive. The stigmatization of and discrimination against these individuals is a clear reminder of the potential problems lurking beneath
the diagnosis. When this potential for discrimination is coupled with the
vulnerability of the child, it seems that any approach to the dilemmas of
the use of genetics with respect to children must be particularly sensitive
to the interests being served and the rights that are being respected. Yet,
for reasons already outlined, children (and embryos and fetuses) may
provide a particularly appropriate group to be targeted by advances in
genetic knowledge, particularly with the availability of prenatal screening, neonatal diagnosis, and the possibility of screening for late-onset
conditions.
There are, arguably, few who would adopt a wholly, or even substantially, negative approach to the "new" genetics. Notwithstanding the
fears already mentioned, society is sufficiently aware of the extraordinary
promise offered by genetic knowledge. In addition, it seems likely, as
with HIV infection, that many residual concerns will dissipate when diagnostic capacity is equalled by therapeutic potential. For this reason, research into genetics is essential. Although "[u]nderstanding does not
always presage more effective treatment,. . . the promise is high.""
The desired outcome of much of the activity in the field of genetics is
therapy. Nonetheless, there is a considerable delay between identifying
the genetic source of a problem and producing a cure. As the United
Kingdom House of Commons Science and Technology Committee has
noted:
While genetics is likely eventually to transform medicine, it may
take some while before treatments based on genetic knowledge
become available. Identifying a disease gene permits diagnosis.
The ability to conduct such a diagnosis may precede discovery of
the gene's functions. While a knowledge of how the gene works,
when established, should, in time, lead to new drug development, through rational drug design, at present it can take fifteen
years to 2develop and gain approval for a new pharmaceutical
product.1
Presently, the only options available where the gene has been isolated
are terminating the affected pregnancies or presenting people with the
enormously difficult decision about whether or not they want to know
11. John Maddox, The Case for the Human Genome, 352
12. COMMNIrEs REPORT, supra note 7, at xxxvi.

NATURE

11, 12 (1991).
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that they will suffer from a particular condition in the future. As one
commentator put it, "there13remains a serious gap between disease charac'
terization and treatment.
The route between attaining the knowledge and developing the therapies is one strewn with ethical, legal, and clinical hurdles. Each hurdle
must be measured and judged carefully. In the meantime, our capacities
grow apace. We may not have many therapies available, but we do know
how to identify more genetic disorders. Maybe such identification will
assist in the struggle to find cures, or at worst, in minimizing the number
of those born suffering from the genetic disorder. Before considering the
arguments for and against genetic screening on an individual or a societywide basis, it is appropriate to consider whether identification or diagnosis of genetic conditions poses any questions which are different from
those raised by any other form of diagnosis.
Clearly, there are many diagnoses which are distressing (e.g., a diagnosis of a condition which is not genetic in its basis). Equally, many diagnoses are not followed by therapy. To return to the example of HIV-status,
diagnosis of seropositivity is generally followed by the onset of full-blown
AIDS and ultimately death. Accordingly, the question must be asked:
Why should society be particularly concerned about genetic diagnosis?
The answer is that, in many ways, the diagnosis of a genetic disorder, or
even of a carrier status, is different from the diagnosis of other conditions
because the ramifications of the diagnosis go far beyond the individual
concerned. The peculiarity of genetic conditions is that they also affect
the individual's family. While health-related information is generally regarded as being an inherently private matter, and the confidentiality of
diagnostic information is usually jealously preserved by doctors, tensions
may emerge when the traditional principles of medical ethics are tested in
genetic disorder cases. This is because the four principles said to underlie
health care-beneficence, nonmalfeasance, autonomy, and justice or equity-are inherently individualized concepts. That is, these principles focus on the specific patient to the exclusion of other actual or potential
patients. Yet, genetic information is not information merely about that
one individual, and the doctor may feel she has obligations of the same
specific type to others actually or potentially affected by the diagnosis in
question.
The historical view of the relationship between doctor and patient has
13. Theodore Friedman, Opinion: The Human Genome Project-SomeImplicationsof
Extensive "Reverse Genetic" Medicine, 46 AM. J. HUM.

GENmETcs

407, 411 (1990).
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been that, in its best manifestations, it is an exclusive and intimate relationship depending on secrecy, confidentiality, and trust. Arguably, only
the fourth principle of medical ethics, that of justice or equity, could readfly encapsulate the problems posed by the interrelationship between genetic information about one person and its relevance to others, because it
could be taken to imply a broader, more utilitarian ethic. Yet, neither
justice nor equity are easy concepts to define, and to use them as a justification for genetic screening or the dissemination of genetic information
even to other identifiable individuals, requires evidence of utility-evidence which is difficult to come by. This is especially true where utility is
defined in terms of curability, as has already been noted. As stated by
one commentator, "[iut could be said of molecular biology that, insofar as
human genetics is concerned, it has gained a scientific empire but not yet
found its real clinical role."1 4
Since this Article is about children, little attention will be paid to the
issues raised by prenatal screening when, arguably, there is no child.
However, it would be remiss to ignore this area for two reasons. First,
prenatal screening in the absence of therapy will probably remain the
most common kind of screening. Second, the view that "there is no
child" is a hypothesis which a number of people in various communities
would hotly dispute. Of course, the second consideration is not capable
of resolution by this writer, but the first can be reasonably addressed.
The growth of prenatal diagnosis based on genetic screening has been
exponential. Writing in 1985, Daniel Kevles pointed to the following:
Amniocentesis and legalized abortion together stimulated a major boom in prenatal genetic diagnosis. Prior to 1976 only some
five thousand prenatal diagnoses of genetic disorders seem to
have been carried out in the United States, and about seventyfive hundred were conducted in Great Britain. After that date,
the number rose rapidly in both countries, reaching at least
twenty thousand annually in the former and seven thousand in
the latter.' 5
There is every reason to believe that this growth has continued. It is now
routine in most developed countries to offer some form of prenatal genetic screening. In addition, advances in both screening capacity and the
number of conditions which can be detected seem likely to presage more
diagnostic intervention in pregnancy. "It seems that we are being sub14. John Davis, Genetic Testing for FamilialHypertonic Cardiomyopathy in Infants:
Ethical Issues, 310 BRrr. MED. J. 856, 858 (1995).
15. KEVLS, supra note 2, at 257.
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jected to a second wave of evangelistic screening fervor generated, at
least in part, by dramatic advances in diagnostic technology." 16
One of the most controversial features of this drive towards prenatal
screening is that there is an expectation that those who find themselves to
be carrying an affected child will terminate their pregnancy. Failure to
terminate in such circumstances has led some commentators to point out
the danger that people who knowingly bring affected children into the
world might be accused of "reproductive irresponsibility."' 7 For this reason, the conclusion of the House of Commons Committee is to be welcomed. In their view:
[I]f the purpose of any test is to allow parents to consider
whether to continue with an affected pregnancy, this should be
made clear and the parents should be given the choice of
whether or not to take the test. If a test shows evidence of a
genetic disorder and the parents decide on abortion, that is allowed under the present law and the decision should be
respected. However, if parents decline the test, or decide to
carry affected children to term, they should also be supported in
their decision ....Screening is only acceptable if it rests on free
and informed consent.'"
Even more controversial, however, is the possibility of presymptomatic
testing for late-onset disorders (in which early treatment or surveillance
19
for complications would not be helpful) and testing for carrier status.
Clearly, an important group for inclusion in such screening programs
would be the very young. There may be many reasons why the funders of
health care (whether state or private) would have an interest in encouraging such programs. They may argue that prior knowledge of the numbers
of people affected by potentially resource intensive conditions would permit rational allocation of their resources.
A recent report of the U.K. Working Party of the Clinical Genetics
Society ("Working Party"), which looked specifically at the area of resource allocation, is worth considering.20 The Working Party's reason for
concentrating on this area was that other genetic testing has had an obvi16.

SCOTTISH FORUM FOR PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE, TOWARDS A SCREENING FOR

SCOTLAND 45 (D. Stone & S. Stewart eds., 1994).
17. Lori A. Whittaker, The Implications of the Human Genome Project for Family
Practice, 35 J. FAM. PRAc.294, 296 (1992).

18. COIErrrE REPORT, supra note 7, at xl (emphasis omitted).
19. Working Party Report, Clinical Genetics Society (U.K.), The Genetic Testing of
Children,31 MED. GENETIcs 785, 787 (1994) [hereinafter Working Party Report].
20. See id.at 785-97.
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ous and relatively immediate clinical goal, and therefore, that testing
could be seen as an ordinary clinical practice not subject to ethical or
other dilemmas beyond the norm. However, the implications of screening for late-onset conditions are considerably more grave, and certainly
raise profound ethical questions.
The Working Party broadly traced the arguments for and against genetic testing in these two areas and made general recommendations
based on a consensus of its members. In their view, there were a number
of arguments against such testing, which centered substantially on the impact of the tests on the individual child. Acknowledging the possibilities
of discrimination, the Working Party also addressed themselves to the
personal impact on the child as he or she develops into maturity. Where
the diagnosis has no direct impact on the health of the child, they suggest
that testing, and knowledge of test results, have a number of negative
implications. For example, they may lead to the loss of self-esteem, affect
the way in which the child is treated in the family or the wider community, prevent a later exercise of autonomy by taking the decision about
testing out of the hands of the potential adult, and breach current U.K.
policies on the need for counseling before or in tandem with screening.
On the other hand, any benefits to be attained are only partial benefits
for the child. One of these benefits is the child's capacity to come to terms
with the situation sooner rather than later. It must be conceded, however, that the reality of this as a benefit will hinge on the age and maturity
of the child and on the nature of the condition detected. This would seem
to militate against testing at an early age. In fact, the other benefits which
might accrue are substantially beneficial for others (e.g., families might
learn to cope and testing might also be offered to other members of the
family). Again, we see the tensions that can be generated between what
might be desirable for the community and the four principles of medical
ethics. If we take these four principles seriously, then the balance must
surely weigh against testing where there is no possibility for direct therapeutic benefit to the individual concerned. Only one of the four principles of medical ethics, namely justice or equity, depending on how it is
defined, might potentially trump the other ethical principles and render
testing justified. However, neither the Working Party nor the House of
Commons Committee was prepared to use this trump card, concluding
that children should not have genetic diagnoses for late-onset disorders.2 '
"Such diagnosis is only justifiable if those requesting it have fully consid21. COMMIrrrE

REPORT,

supra note 7, at xxxviii.
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ered all its implications."' Clearly, the very young child will be in no
position to make such a request, and there must be some doubt as to
whether or not parents are lawfully able to make such a request, when it
is clear that the test is not unequivocally in the best interests of the child.
Testing for late-onset disorders may help the family adjust, and it may
allow them to make plans, but the most likely consequences for the child
will be negative.
Bearing in mind what has been said about the need to protect children
and to refrain from using them to serve someone else's purposes, the current practice at the moment is in line with a number of recommendations
including those of the World Health Organization.' Specifically, the current practice is to screen routinely only for conditions that are serious and
for which there is a known treatment.24 This approach would seem to be
in accord with the principles of medical ethics, and also reflects the goal
of both society and the law to maximize the protection of children. In
any event, one might argue that consent by proxy in this case is no different from any other treatment decision that parents are authorized to
make "in the best interests" of their child.
Although the law is not inevitably, or even commonly, seen as a vehicle
within which ethical principles are formulated or expressed, it may be
interesting nonetheless to examine by analogy the probable legal response to this apparent conflict between the interests of the child and the
interests of the community. From cases involving facts as diverse as taking blood from very young children for the purposes of paternity testing
to decisions about contraception and sterilization, it may be possible to
extrapolate the principles by which the law would approach these complex matters.
One principle that corresponds most closely to the first of the four
principles of medical ethics is that something which is done without informed consent is only justifiable when it is done in the best interests of
the individual. This has arisen most commonly in cases involving nonconsensual sterilization where the courts have made it clear that the interests
of others have no relevance or priority.' Thus, even if justice might be
22. Id

23. SCOrrISH FORUM FOR PtBLIC HIEALH MEDICNE, supra note 16,64-65

(discussing

the World Health Organization's criteria for genetic screening).

24. CormmrrEE REPORT, supra note 7, at xli. Phenylketonuria (PKU) is an example
of such a condition. Id
25. See Re D (a minor) (wardship: sterilization), [19761 1 All E.R. 326; Re Eve, 31
D.L.R. 4th 1 (1986).
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served by allowing the sterilization, if the justice was not for the individual herself then it was clearly trumped by the need to value the rights and
interests of that person and not the rights and interests of others.
Equally, it has to be said that concentrating on the individual's best interests also closes off a substituted judgment argument in favor of intervention, namely that the individual might have chosen it if they could have.
This has particular relevance for genetic screening. First, if the best
interests of the individual are given priority, then it will be necessary to
consider what the outcome of obtaining the information would be on that
individual. Whether the screening is predictive or for carrier status, if it is
for untreatable conditions it has been alleged that "[g]enetic or clinical
screening of asymptomatic people is contentious as no intervention has
been definitively proved to alter prognosis."2 6 If this is added to the potential for devaluation and discrimination already outlined, it would seem
difficult to justify this screening as being in the individual's "best interests." It is implausible to suggest that people would, under the substituted judgment test, knowingly choose in significant numbers to acquire
information that has a negative consequence. Thus, even if our legal tradition embraced the use of the substituted judgment test, it too would
likely militate against obtaining such information. In any event, although
we allow adults to make decisions that are not in their best interests, the
tradition is to protect children by denying them this right until they reach
maturity.
Moreover, as previously discussed, the main reasons in favor of such
screening relates to the interests of others. This approach was expressly
precluded by the above examples. Thus, the recommendations of the
Working Party are in line with the rules extrapolated from the law;
namely, in the case of predictive screening, "there should be a presumption against such testing." 27 In relation to testing for carrier status,
although conceding that "[t]he arguments here are less clear[,] ... the
working party has ... arrived at a consensus view that carrier tests in
childhood should generally be deferred."'
These recommendations
stand even in the face of possible benefits to others. As one commentator said, "[W]e cannot assume that making use of present patients for the
good of future patients is ethically legitimate, particularly since the pa26. Mark P. Ryan et al., Genetic Testing for FamilialHypertrophic Cardiomyopathyin
Newborn Infants: Clinicians' Perspective, 310 Brrr. MED. J. 856, 856 (1992).
27. Working Party Report, supra note 19, at 791.
28. Id at 792.
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29
tients are in no position to volunteer.
Although the arguments seem reasonably clear, the balance will undoubtedly shift as more therapeutic potential emerges. Even though the
balance may change, this does not mean that the ethical principles to be
applied are necessarily subject to variation on account of clinical possibility. Whatever the predicted clinical outcome, the fundamental ethical inquiry remains the same. As is often the case, legal issues are frequently
more difficult to distinguish from ethical ones. In dealing with new possibilities, the law should proceed from fundamental principles and values
that can be broadly described as ethical. Although a wealth of jurisprudence exists concerning the status of children in the law, medical progress
stimulates new challenges and demands innovative interpretations.
This discussion will conclude with a consideration of three main areas
of legal interest that are relevant to the question of screening children for
genetic conditions or predispositions. The first is the question of consent.
It has already been suggested that it is difficult to find an abstract justification for endorsing the presymptomatic screening of very young children
where no cure or therapy is available. The question, then, must be at
what stage a child may offer his or her own consent?
Under the Family Law Reform Act 1969 (England and Wales) and the
Age of Legal Capacity Act 1991 (Scotland), the capacity of children to
consent to treatment is clarified (although it is not clear why Scottish Law
needed the clarification). In both jurisdictions, a young person over the
age of sixteen years may offer valid consent to medical treatment,
although in England and Wales (but not Scotland) that same child will
not always have a refusal of consent vindicated.30
Where the relevant legislation does not apply, that is where the child is
under the age of sixteen years, the decision rests on the common law.
Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech HospitalAuthority3 ' is a leading case
on this topic. In Gillick, the House of Lords sought to clarify the extent
to which a child could agree without parental consent to medical intervention. This case is perhaps peculiarly suited to the question of genetic
screening because it also involved medical intervention that is arguably
nontherapeutic. This is of importance because both the principles of
Scottish Law and court decisions in England and Wales reinforced the
view that older children could offer a valid consent to therapy. However,
29. Davis, supra note 14, at 858.

30. Re R (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) 7 BMLR 147 (1992).
31. [1982] 1 All E.R. 402.
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neither contraception, as in Gillick, nor genetic screening necessarily fit
easily into the category of therapy as we might routinely describe it.
Broadly, the Gillick decision indicated that if the children were of sufficient maturity to understand the nature and the consequences of what
they were seeking, then the doctor (who makes that decision, although on
what grounds it is not clear) may lawfully proceed without reference to
the parents, although they are encouraged to persuade the young person
to seek the views of their parents. From the perspective of genetic
screening, for doctors to proceed on a young person's request would
seem to require a finding of a high level of maturity, given that the nature
and consequences of screening are much more complex than decisions
involving a young person's desire to avoid an unwanted pregnancy. In
line with policy guidelines, the child should receive prescreening counseling, 32 which provides an additional opportunity to assess levels of understanding and maturity.
Although discussed previously in this Article, it is worth addressing a
further question. If the child is either too young for Gillick competence
or is found otherwise not sufficiently mature, and therefore, not authorized to agree on her own behalf, is there someone else who could agree
on the child's behalf? The House of Commons Committee seems to assume that this might be possible. In rejecting mass screening for public
health reasons "unless a treatmentfor the disorderexists,"'33 they nonetheless concluded that "[p]arents should, of course, be able to ask for genetic
diagnosis to be carried out on a particular child where family history suggests this may be appropriate. This will become increasingly commonplace and will bring benefits by avoiding multiple referrals due to
misdiagnosis."'
Diagnosis is in a sense no different from individual screening unless
therapy is available. This statement reflects an ideological shift, or perhaps even some confusion over the interests at stake; for one must assume that it relates only to conditions for which some therapy is
available. However, this must remain a moot point. If diagnosis of this
sort is what is being referred to, then it is unclear why it is necessary to
single it out because presumably it is covered in the general, applicable
rules of law.
In any event, the general rule of law would seem to be that parents and
32. CoMMrrEFE REPORT, supra note 7, at xxxiii.

33. Id. at xlii.

34. it

1995]

Genetic Screening of Children

those in loco parentis,rather than having absolute rights over the children
under their care, might be said to have responsibilities. This is a critical
difference because it constrains what those with parental authority can
actually do; limiting it to what is in the "best interests" of the child. But
if screening for late-onset conditions is not clearly in the child's "best
interests," then it is unclear on what basis it could be authorized by
others, regardless of their relationship to the child.
Interestingly, the Working Party found a difference of opinion between
those who might be engaged in the screening of children. They noted
that "[g]eneticists and coworkers were less likely to view parental wishes
alone as sufficient to justify testing than were pediatricians and others."'35
Indeed, the former group may be right to feel this way. The overwhelming weight of advantage in such testing is for others, not the child. As a
matter of interest, one alternative to the "best interests" test or substituted judgment test might be that parental consent by proxy could be
validly given to procedures which are not against the best interests of the
child. This is a subtle, but potentially important difference, in the field of
genetic testing. This standard may be difficult to satisfy, however, given
the reality that diagnosis may have a profoundly negative impact on the
child.
A second legal problem relates to confidentiality-the basis of the doctor-patient relationship. The fundamental principle of confidentiality is
that patients have a right to expect that information that is personal to
them and that is provided in the course of a confidential relationship will
not be disclosed to othersA6 Of course, even the General Medical Council ("GMC"), the body that is responsible for setting and maintaining
standards of practice in the U.K., concedes such wide exceptions to this
rule3 7 that many believe it to have been significantly eroded. Nonetheless, it remains a fundamental tenet of medical practice that confidentiality should be maintained.
Every time a diagnosis is given to a parent, the diagnosis involves disclosure of sensitive information about one person (the child) to another.
This is expressly accounted for in the GMC's exceptions.3 " But the disclosure of genetic information regarding a child may have highly significant consequences for a child in his or her family and in other
35. Working Party Report, supra note 19, at 787.
36. THE GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr
FiTNEss TO PRACrIsE 26 (1992).

37. Id. at 27.

38. 1&

AND DISCIPLINE:
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environments. These consequences could be much greater, and potentially more negative, than the disclosure of other diagnoses. The interests
of the child may not be served by giving the information to the parents,
yet the parents will likely be the people who have authorized the test.
As the Danish Council of Ethics pointed out:
Because of the nature of genes, it may be argued that genetic
information about any individual should not be regarded as personal to that individual, but as the common property of other
people who may share those genes, and who need the information in order to find out their own genetic constitution. If so, an
individual's prima facie right to confidentiality and privacy
might be regarded as overridden by the rights of others to have
access to information about themselves .... 39
Although the question of genetic disposition clearly does involve others,
if we return to the original hypothesis that society seeks to protect children qua children, then it might be inconsistent to apply what is essentially a utilitarian test to circumvent the provision of a right that would
otherwise have been held to be of vital importance. Equally, because
parents may have access under legislation to their children's medical
records,40 the mere acquisition of genetic knowledge about a child may
threaten the confidential nature of the doctor-patient relationship to its
ultimate detriment. This provides yet another reason for not screening in
the first place.
A final legal issue is that of professional liability. In the U.K., the test
for liability remains effectively a professional one. Although other jurisdictions (such as some states in the United States4 and Australia 42) have
moved away from this, the U.K. appears to follow it. The test derives
from the case of Bolam v. FriernHospital Management Committee43 (the
"Bolam test") and effectively states that a doctor will not be negligent if
she acts in accordance with a practice held to be reasonable by a responsible body of medical opinion.44 Therefore, it could be said, although
39. WoRKING GROUP, ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON, ETMICAL ISSUES
rN CLmicAL GENEI-cs para 4.10 (1991) [hereinafter ETHICAL ISSUES].
40. Access to Health Records Act, 1990 Ch. 23 § 3 (Eng.).
41. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,783 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972) (adopting a "prudent person" test rather than the more traditional professional model).
42. See, e.g., Rogers v. Whitaker, 67 A.L.J.R. 47 (Austl. 1992) (holding that the Bolam
test was not applicable to questions of consent, particularly when direct questions had been
asked by the patient).

43. [1957] 2 All E.R. 118 (Q.B.).
44. Id. at 121.
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somewhat simplistically, that as long as some doctors are behaving in a
certain way, then no liability will attach.
An interesting feature of this test relates to the dependence of legal
judgment on accepted medical practice. The evidence obtained by the
Working Party suggested that, for the moment at least, practices vary.45
This makes it likely that a responsible body of medical opinion will be
found to endorse whatever the individual doctor has or has not done,
thereby virtually ensuring that legal liability will not be attributed. However, it should be said that there is an increasing trend in contemporary
medicine to develop codes of practice that might be thought of as codes
of best practice. If such codes are developed in relation to genetic screening, it will become harder to argue in favor of the doctor who deviates
from that code, at least under the Bolam test. If this occurs, then the
U.K. courts will probably return to the test outlined in Hunter v. Hanley, 4 which effectively asks whether or not any doctor acting with due
skill and care would have also followed the challenged practice. Under
either test, the attribution of liability will be difficult to secure.
It has been said by some that the new genetics does not create any new
ethical problems. Even if this is true, it certainly poses the old dilemmas
in stark new ways. The Royal College of Physicians of London noted:
The fact that the problems are essentially the same suggests that
to the extent that certain ethical standards are applicable in
other areas of medicine, these will apply equally in the context
of genetics. However, some new considerations do arise in genetics, and they at least raise the question of whether the familiar problems should always be approached by means of familiar
ethical standards. 47

This is the heart of the problem. It is often said that law and ethics lag
behind medicine and science. For example, Australian Judge Windeyer
colorfully described the law's relationship with medicine as being "in the
rear and limping."8 Equally, even if there are no new ethical problems
posed, this does not mean that we have resolved the question of which
ethical considerations can or should be applied to the new problems
raised. Rather, it may mean that, in the abstract, we have the means to
decide. In addition, what has gone before may also suggest that
medicine and science are running ahead of themselves. Because
45. See Working Party Report, supra note 19, at 786.
46. 1955 Sess. Cas. 200, 206 (Scot. 1st Div.).
47. EmcAL IssuEs, supra note 39, at para. 4.3.
48. Mount Isa Mines, Ltd. v. Pusey, 125 C.L.R. 383, 395 (1970).
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medicine and science do not develop in a vacuum, those who practice
these professions must also have a framework within which to operate
safely and appropriately, both for the sake of their patients and themselves. Therefore, if we are to offer adequate protection to children as
defined earlier, it seems that scrutiny of our decisions must take account
of a further test to the four principles of medical ethics outlined above.
As has also been suggested, what the test should be is by no means clear.
We purport to protect children, but seem to have no clarity of content to
the test which should apply in pursuit of this goal.
This brief review suggests that ethical analysis is by no means as sophisticated as it would need to be if we are to combine the best of medical
ethics with a rational respect for children. The Working Party report
shows acute sensitivity to this, yet may be seen by some as a stultifying
progress. In recognition of this, the House of Commons Committee proposes the creation of a Human Genetics Commission which, among other
responsibilities, has the power to "prescribethe circumstances in which
particulartypes of screening or diagnosis, such as pre-natal diagnosis,
should be provided or proscribed."4 9 This is a radical proposal because it
favors legislative intervention in the practice of medicine. Yet, given the
complexities and the implications of the new genetics, it is one which this
author very much welcomes.
The creation of such a Commission will not supply the answers to the
fundamental ethical dilemmas outlined here. The acquisition of genetic
knowledge potentially sets the individual and the community against each
other for two reasons. First, the individual whose genetic makeup is
known might be thought to have a moral obligation of disclosure to those
who may also be affected. Yet, this obligation is not generally held to
exist in other circumstances. Medical information is seen as among the
most private of all, and overriding that "privacy" right requires forceful
justification. In the case of genetic information, the principle used to justify overriding the privacy right would be the benefit to others which
would be achieved. This is a classic utilitarian approach, and therefore
often unpopular. In any event, to impose a moral obligation to disclose
genetic information would be to impose a duty to rescue-one which the
law does not require, save in exceptional circumstances. 5 0 Indeed, it may
be that this is a new ethical problem posed by genetic science.
49. COMMrrE REPORT, supra note 7, at lvi.
50. For example, where there is a preexisting duty of care, as in the doctor-patient

relationship.
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Second, genetic information has wider public dimensions. It might be
argued that insurers, employers, sexual partners, and those who are responsible for the allocation of health care resources also have a right to
this information. The public interest might therefore equally be invoked
as a justification for dissemination of otherwise private information. We
would be well-advised, however, to recognize the caution of Judge Rose
in the case of X v. Y, 51 that there is a difference between what is in the
public interest and what interests the public.
Thus, as the Danish Council of Ethics succinctly stated:
[I]t can be said that a decisive stand on the new challenges must
be based on a choice between the two overall approaches: the
utilitarian view or the approach based on the help motive and
respect for the individual. The question, in other words, is: must
the principal purpose of applying human genetics be formulated
in terms of the gain for the common good or in terms of the
individual?- 2
Manifestly, this is not a question soluble within or by any one discipline.
It merits and demands public debate. As stated by the House of Commons Committee, "[tjhe dilemmas that genetics poses will be resolved by
the public and parliamentarydebate, not by academics alone. But that debate must be well informed, both about the science itself and about its ethical, legal and social implications."53 Arguably, such debate is particularly
important when the vulnerable, such as children, are a likely target group.
However, public debate requires public understanding of the issues,
which in turn demands that the public is given access to the information
needed to formulate relevant questions and reach appropriate conclusions. The responsibility, therefore, rests on the educational process, the
media, and the scientists themselves to ensure that such a debate can occur. In the case of children, public understanding must be additionally
informed by a thorough analysis of the responsibility that the community
has to children by an honest assessment of the tests that we apply when
making decisions on their behalf.
In conclusion, and with peculiar resonance with respect to vulnerable
groups such as children, "[a] broad public understanding of the scientific
basis of medical genetics is essential if informed public policy decisions
are to be taken about the introduction of genetic screening programmes.
51.

[1988] 2 All E.R. 648, 658 (Q.B.).
OF Emics, supra note 10, at 64.
CoMmrrrEE REPORT, supra note 7, at lxxxv.

52. DANISH Cotmc

53.
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' 54
Such programmes ... have both an individual and a public dimension.
The task, therefore, is informative and educational rather than scientific
or clinical. We may, in recognition of this reality, carry a responsibility to
present and future generations to moderate the pace of scientific inquiry
to accommodate the ethical debate-not merely to do something because

we can.

54. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIoETHIcS, GENETIC

(1993).
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